Abstract: How do we understand links between sufism and pro-egalitarian revolutionary activism in the early twentieth century; and how did upland compositions of self and community help constitute revolutionary activism in South Asia more broadly? Using Pashto poetry as my archive I integrate a history of radical egalitarian thought and political practice to a holistic study of self-making; of imperial spatiality; and of shifting gradients of power in the regions between Kabul and Punjab. Amid a chaotic rise of new practices of imperial and monarchic hegemony around the turn of the twentieth century, I argue, older sedimentations of 'devotee selfhood' in the high valleys of eastern Afghanistan gave rise, in social spaces preserved by self-reflexive poetic practice and circulation, to conscious desires for avoidance of all forms of hierarchy or sovereignty, in favour of a horizontal politics of reciprocity. Such inchoate drives for freedom later played a role in constituting anti-statist revolutionary subjectivities across great geographical and social distance. From upland sufi roots they rippled outward to intersect with the work of transnational socialist and anti-imperialist militants in Indian nationalist circles too; and even influenced scholars at the heart of the nascent Afghan nation-state.
Introduction
The most prominent communist organiser in British India's Northwest Frontier Province in the 1930s and 40s was 'Abd al-Rahim Popalzai, mufti (legal authority) of Peshawar and a Deoband graduate. Contrary to claims that there was little 'Islamic' in his political commitments, 1 Popalzai narrated his activism in terms of piety and of sufi cosmology, citing his acute awareness of wahdat al-wujud, the unity of all being; and the implications of this unity for the individual self and for social responsibility. He also cited dream-apparitions by the Sahib of Hadda, an activist saint of the border region. 2 Likewise, Sulayman Layiq, a renowned poet, Politburo member, and Afghan Minister of Culture in the communist 1980s, traces his specific politics to internationalism; but in examining his own activist impulse, he cites his childhood on the Indo-Afghan border in a pastoralist mulla family who were embedded in activist devotional networks. 3 How do we understand the links between revolutionary affect and borderland
Islam that occur so frequently in activist narratives of the period? English-language research involving the frontier has often split cosmopolitan genealogies of the left from 'Muslim identity politics'. 4 Urdu-language historiography has more often located ideas of social justice in lineages of reformist Islam. 5 But both bodies of research focus on how elites brought cosmopolitan ideas like pan-Islam, reformism, or socialism to the frontier. Like imperial anxiety over 'Wahhabis' and 'Bolshevik' agents, 6 they depend on ideas of a static frontier, in which social change results mostly from outside dynamism.
Finally, in contrast to the above, more recent work has argued that militancy in the Indo-Afghan borderland is better understood contextually, especially in terms of structures of inequality in local and global political economy. This includes the figuration of the imperial frontier as a regional and global frontier in the first instance.
This focus is exemplified by a number of selections in Magnus Marsden and Ben
Hopkins' 2012 volume Beyond Swat, and has been influenced by debates over class and regional dynamics in the rise of post-2001 Taliban movements. This line of argumentation has had more sociological nuance, and attention to spatiality and power begins to raise the question of why Deobandi activism in the Frontier, for example, resulted in large-scale radical counterorganization, rather than movements of individualized self-help and personal piety as in the north Indian plains. I build on this line of argumentation here.
But, such framing can risk reinscribing the very notions of centre and periphery that underlay the structures it critiques. And, even recent research has prioritised modern ideation-centred notions of activism; whereas even the brief account of Popalzai above, with his dream-devotion and his sensitivity to constitutions of selfhood by a broader cosmos, suggests subtler combinations of reflexive thought and interpersonal emotional geographies. So can we move away from marginalising accounts of 'frontier leftism,' toward one that centres upland space; and one that is as sensitive to indigenous modes of understanding action as it is to self-universalising concepts like 'socialism'?
This essay forms a bottom-up complement to Yasmin Saikia's discussion, in this collection, of actors between global and local worlds. In it, I integrate a history of radical egalitarian thought and political practice to a holistic study of selfhood; of spatiality; and of shifting gradients of power in the regions between Kabul and Punjab.
In the first half, I retell histories of sufi militancy on the frontier from a devotee's perspective, to read 'sufism' in terms of individual and collective technologies of self-making. Mutuality in agrarian ritual was inseparable from modes of devotion that emphasised social concern and social levelling; while pilgrimage routes, scholarly networks, and the circulation of sufi poetic techniques of self-creation that they fostered, linked individual devotion and local agrarian practices to wider domains. Post-1870s extensions of new forms of sovereignty fractured these worlds suddenly, superimposing multiple hierarchies of tribe and sufi lineage onto them. But amid a chaotic rise of new forms of hegemony, I argue, older sedimentations of 'devotee selfhood' gave rise, in social spaces preserved by self-reflexive poetic practice and circulation, to conscious desires for avoidance of all hierarchy in favour of a horizontal politics of reciprocity.
Such inchoate drives for freedom later played a role in constituting revolutionary subjectivities across great geographical and social distance. Local Afghan devotional worlds and mobile peoples formed a lattice of connected space in Certeau's sense, a "polyvalent unity of...contractual proximities" from the highlands to the Indian plain, produced by cumulative devotional use. 7 Upland histories were intimately connected to the wider world. So, once we re-centre upland ontologies we should also ask: how did mountain histories shape wider politics? In this essay's second half, I explore the lives of upland history not as counterpoint to better-known channels of activism, but as a neglected presence within them. Of course, if elite activists like Popalzai narrate mountain sufi roots, one might dismiss this as a bid for legitimacy; but I contend there is more to it. I argue that rhetoric of non-state sovereignty at the 1920s Afghan court is not explainable only by court intellectuals' often-cited European and Turkish advisers. I argue the same regarding the activism of World War I-era cross-border leftist scholars. I do not dismiss the impact of cosmopolitan genealogies, but I argue that the dynamism of older devotional worlds and new activism together posited new radical alternatives.
I begin tracing these milieus through one of the few non-elite archives we have on early twentieth century Afghanistan's eastern uplands: Pashto selections from an oral corpus of songs in Pashai, Pashto, Urdu, and Persian attributed to Muhammad Nur (b. 1864), a tenant farmer from the Alingar valley. In the next section I describe how power, operating in society and within subjects, constituted the borderland in the late nineteenth century. But Muhammad Nur's decentralised poetic landscapes, in the section after that, were other parallel worlds. These nurtured their own dynamic critical resources: indeed, the reflexivity in Muhammad Nur's songs and in his oral history provides the interpretive frame for my account here.
I: Sovereignty and Territory
By the 1880s, as with imperial frontiers across the world in this period, British technologies of rule fragmented and encapsulated populations on both sides of the Indo-Afghan border. Starting in the 1850s, bureaucratic authoritarianism in the newlyannexed frontier gradually institutionalised the violence of a colonial state as it expanded, in a manner similar to the way it did in Punjab of which it was originally part: formalisation of landed elites' customary law; individualised policing; land revenue settlements. As Robert Nichols has traced, over the next half-century, practices of managing frontier security gradually differentiated the irrigated, revenue-producing trans-Indus districts from the less accessible borderland, with the former paying the expenses of garrisoning the empire against, largely, the latter. The border areas were grouped into Tribal Agencies.
As Maira Hayat argues, this mode of indirect control accentuated the political salience of tribe and locality, through policies that saw lineages as collective agents and gave them stakes in acting as such. 9 Tribal subsidies were disbursed through Political Agents to hand-picked elders, who received places on 'tribal councils' in exchange for preventing cross-border crime into 'Settled' territory. Mobility, including trade, did not end but was newly disciplined. At the same time the colonial state disavowed governance in the Agencies but, building on Criminal Tribes legislation that allowed suspension of legal process, the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation formalised collective punishment, including punitive military operations that punctuate the region's history even now. Neither inside nor outside the state, border residents were subject to violence by a distant imperial army; while a new intensification of lineage patriarchy and seniority was the local face of outsourced rule, by a colonial state that still claimed sovereign rights over life. In response to all this fragmentation, Pashto folklore shows a sharp rise in attention, from about 1900 to 1925, to transgressive self-formation: tales of hyper-individuals who transcend administrative boundaries, economy, elders, tribe, even sometimes gender, through morally complex 'criminal' agency. Afghan rule too was consolidated through modalities of inclusion and exclusion that were personalised and tribalised, backed by military force. As Christine Noelle argues, the Amir Sher 'Ali (r. 1863-1879) dismantled intermediary power between regional potentates and the state, and many local khans, or power brokers, came into direct negotiation with the centre. Colonial archives see him as a sometimeally of the Amir. 19 He earned his own authority as a miracle worker and a scholar too.
And, ordinary devotees like Muhammad Nur, the subject of the next section, remade the Sahib as a devotee-centric institution, through modes of community that undermined all the territory described above.
II: Other Geographies, and Devotional Subjects, ca. 1900
The following elegy for the Sahib of Hadda dates to after the Sahib's 1903 death. It speaks of militancy but does not centre it, or even elite saintly agency. It narrates a miracle in which imperial designs were averted through nothing more than a gathering of devotees harvesting the crops at Hadda to fuel the langar, or community kitchen. It may refer to any of many expeditions against Hadda's networks, over the early 1900s: [ 20 The central story is a miracle attached to the Sahib but the focus is not on saintly The Sifatnama's extant manuscript dates to the nineteenth century and the text was transmitted orally for some time prior to that, but its editor Scarcia believes that its original written text dates to the sixteenth century. Sifatnama, then, is best seen as a text in which discourses from earlier waves of conversion sat in dialogue with ongoing action; and the process described is not only one of erasure. and 'ulama's overlapping professional fields, while the popular epithet 'Haji' (pilgrim) for subaltern poets registers both a transcendent power of poetic speech and a translocality to these fields. In an early twentieth century sermon on sin by Mulla Haji Gul, a scholar of the Jalalabad plain, we hear:
Students spend time with me too; where they form musical factions They all call me 'Haji'; people should note these facts My enemies, and outsiders, flee everywhere I go, in awe [because of my power] I ask them for a poet's patronage (qalang); they give me authority, like a master 24 From these circuits, students moved into better-studied, more elite scholarly-suficommercial networks that arose in the eighteenth century between Delhi and Bukhara to become among the most important unifying factors of a politically decentralised zone, networks that forthcoming work by Waleed Ziad explores; and into newer Deobandi educational webs as well. 25 Returning to oral poets like Muhammad Nur: local worlds nourished powerful networks and their institutions, and non-elites tried to carve out autonomy in these networks, as the Hadda case shows. But also, some saints coalesced through literary participation alone, not through allegiance networks; and this was not merely an issue of space, but of space-making technologies that were also technologies of self-making.
The subaltern perspective that the Sahib of Hadda is but the sum of his devotees finds parallel in existing practices of saintly poetic co-authorship and co-authority. Tawakkul, a poet who lived a generation before Muhammad Nur, also moved across circuits of anonymous Qadiri shrines in lower Kunar, east of Laghman. 26 He survives as Tawakkul 'Baba', a saint in his own right, and songs attributed to him are still occasionally composed today: anyone can 'sign' a song with 'Tawakkul's' authorship if it articulates sentiments that fit the saint's evolving persona. 27 As Parita Mukta argues with regard to the better-studied Mira tradition in India, speaking in a saint's persona involves partial assimilation of the devotee's selfhood to new subject-positions: part of the devotee's agentive self is realised as, or 'becoming-in', Tawakkul. 28 This kind of saint is a hub: both an agent and a collective subject. Couplets from many songs allude to this:
I meekly submit; I ask for peace! If I was Hindu, just consider me Muslim So don't kill me, O strong one! Let's meander leisurely together on the road Or:
Tawakkul's poetry circulates as devotees' prayers Those who came to take part, set out on the road for this goal 29 The first is from a song that is a variation on a trope common in South Asian devotional poetry: a non-Muslim professional poet faces off against a Muslim one in a village competition, the usual way poets and their retinues earned patronage. In Pashto versions like this, the weaker party, the non-Muslim, often emerges victorious through superior wit. 30 Tawakkul's variation subverts an antagonistic idea of victory, calling attention to the violence of the encounter but then harmonising his opponent's voice onto his "road". The second couplet is also a common trope: collective sainthood was conscious and reflexive, and songs constantly allude to it. The first couplet's "meanderingtogether" would easily be understood as an allegory for wider practices of collaborative circulation; and its subversion of violence, a collective statement on alternative politics. Finally, interregional poetic circulation returned to remake institutions of local authority. In life, professional poets could not avoid local power. They typically performed in hujras: the men's lodges that local notables or lineages kept as public space and as lodging for travellers and for workers during harvest. Based on sources like Darmesteter's monumental 1888 compendium of oral poetry, Chants populaires des Afghans, poets of the period sang love songs, and elite-centred narratives about monarchy, empire, and local notables. But while Tawakkul and, later, Muhammad Nur sang such genres too, both are famous for didactic songs that infused transcendent discourse into this temporal space. Such genres and personae, and the publics who sang them, assimilated the power of elite patronage, regional scholarship, and saintly power to transcend all three. Afghan folklorists note they were performed at the start of gatherings as illocution, temporarily making the men's lodge into a space where plural perspectives were speakable whether they supported local power or not. 33 Returning to the point: interregional practice looped back into local space and local selves, giving poets some power to temporarily deterritorialise the hujra. This kind of poetry shaped both subjects and institutions, and linked everyday material world-making activities like collective harvest into the various transcendences of sainthood and of a mobile society.
This was the professional milieu Muhammad Nur inherited. Let us return to his biography. In oral history collected by folklorist Zalmay Hewadmal, he was conscripted to the army in 'Abd al-Rahman's reign. The community of Muhammad Nur imagined this world with a power to outlast specific hierarchies, to continuously arm subjects against elite subjectivation, and to ensure cultural survival. Here Muhammad Nur visualises poetic community-horizontal community like his that did not spread through the path of master and student-as a tool of resilience and a weapon of resistance amid dominant reorderings of the world:
[Refrain] The rotating times of the world have passed and are passing; The kings of the world will not remain. * * * They passed and are passing; but if you understand Take a torch, fear not the pitch-black Elsewhere, a reflexive comment by Muhammad Nur on his own communities?
... Airplanes fly in the air -They make all kinds of different noises As automobiles drive on the roads, they conceal a lost caravan... 40 It is this vision that drives my argument in the second half of this essay. 'Hidden swords' like Muhammad Nur's weakened the threads in webs of authority that tied together imperial and monarchic space; even more so for the fact that his songs spread horizontally, without students. But as we will see, by 1920, oral-poetic 'caravans' travelled a parallel trajectory alongside other entrepreneurs, who presented their own positionality as universal: reformist intellectuals of a crossregional Persian and Urdu print sphere in urban Afghanistan, Turkistan, and India. Drawing both on international Persianate modernism and on nascent nationalist counter-hegemony, these webs of culture might also seem to marginalise rural populations at first glance. And yet, they were not always so separate from upland space. Yes, upland worlds were reordered amid new political economies, and reciprocal community-making practices like ashar fell out of custom (indeed in one song Muhammad Nur suggests that the jihads of the age should appropriately be directed at the deceits of the market economy and elite-centered notions of transregional civilisation). 41 But broad notions of mutuality were relocated into the virtual world of poetic space in an era when material antihierarchy was a fading memory. As the next section argues, this increased the domains of such notions: oral poetic 'hidden swords' were taken up by elite scholars who moved between rural and urban worlds, and were a vital part of more directly revolutionary politics. O Lord, may you populate and make prosperous -The hujra of our unity Let us gather together as selves in this space -The dispersed Pashtun faction [dala] Make as one heart, one breath, make as one -These scattered Pashtuns From Kashmir to Herat, distant -From Balochistan, to where we stand They are all Pashtuns, wherever -Atomised, they may be Make an entity -O God, of these separate atoms ... 54 The hujra metaphor was important in this era, that of NWFP Chief Commissioner George Roos-Keppel. Roos-Keppel's policies aimed to defuse political reform and accentuate political informality by accentuating 'Pashtun' culture like hujras that could support elite khans' face-to-face networks. 55 But by now, large landowner politics were often absentee, focused on ties to colonial bureaucracy, while rural opposition among the small gentry and peasantry began remaking the village hujra. It embodied notables' authority; but also other, non-state, politics too; and it now began to house popular oppositional organisation. 56 Hujras thus became a regular site of colonial policing, as 'Abd al-Ghaffar Khan writes. 57 Other contemporaries note in memoirs that from the war period, even mildly reformist Urdu publications like Zamindar were, in the Frontier, confiscated during hujra searches. 58 Activist media were seldom written, then, and activism like Makhfi's adapted to the forum that hujras provided: mobile and contingent activism, unwritten poetics rather than prose.
Afghan and imperial rule both triangulated subjects in a matrix of tribe, lineage, village, and other social and geographic territory. In the uplands, Muhammad Nur's anonymous pathways broke these bounds of rooted location, and forged mobile publics as lines of flight. In Makhfi's Settled Districts, as in more elite Afghan politics, state rule created inequality between those for whom roots and lineage were an advantage, like aristocrats or large landowners; and the rest, for whom roots and lineage were more ambivalent features of the social landscape. by Chattopadhyay in this compilation. By the early 1930s, Azad was more responsive to populist currents from which he had earlier segregated himself, and further evolutions of his thought had appeared in print: his eclectic Qur'anic exegesis derived concepts of rububiyat (lordship) and rahmat (mercy) into a call for social service that was also taken up by the Khudai Khidmatgar movement. In this argument, Azad held that Islam is service to God; while God is both a Nurturing Lord (Rabb) and is Self-Sufficient, requiring no service; so true service of God involves social service by proxy: making oneself a channel for God's merciful nurturing of humanity without regard for sect, gender or ethnicity. 60 Similar sentiments, even a quasi-Azadian lexicon, appear in Makhfi's work above, especially with the refrain 'Rabba' used in this specific context. Notably, though, populism emerges in Makhfi's songs earlier than in Azad's work, even as the idea of anonymity resonates with the model of revolutionary secret society activism that Azad worked in during the 1910s. But returning to the primary point, can we link this, and Makhfi's egalitarian songs more broadly, to sedimentations of earlier devotion as much as to ashraf anti-imperialism? Makhfi's integration into networks like those of his pir Haji Sahib of Turangzai, and into Hadda's by extension, was not just a matter of political allegiance. Outside urban constructions of Haji Sahib as either nationalist-reformer or outlaw-fanatic, a corpus of oral poetry is devoted to him too as a saint. 61 And while the song above was part of proto-Congress activism, for this same reason it shows oral-poetic worlds were now inhabiting new social domains. It produces revolutionary desire through devotional desire, building on the topos of the rose as a devotee's paradigmatic beloved. But the song here adapts a didactic genre of prophetic stories that Muhammad Nur also used, to bring local action into eschatological space-time centred around a mass rather than a messiah. It uses a refrain typical of Pashto call-and-response genres to reinforce a performative 'we', one that calls for activists to speak truth to power but that also directs devotional passion into subaltern mutuality. And, the song links mutuality to its own poetic publics, in a way that echoes Muhammad Nur's 'hidden pathways' of collective survival as much as anything else: "Those who have no voice to shout, whisper secretly in their lovers' hearts; the secrets of their hearts are like the scent of a rose". The song is by Makhfi.
But its form reflects the participative audiences Makhfi met, who circulated and preserved it beyond its initial performance. Audiences maintained slippages between devotional and revolutionary desire in collaboration with activists like Makhfi.
Kabul's Constitutionalists assumed statism in their attempts at counterhegemony. So did the Indian National Congress. Makhfi's work intersected with these spheres, but was sustained by polyvocal anonymous worlds of hujra poetry. His activism, like Mahmud al-Hasan's call to deconstruct all structures, wrested space away from empire, monarchy, and elite nationalism, more than it aimed to consolidate specific gains. Its emphasis was process, not telos; and it grounded its process in the hujra's everyday space, organic with casual and contingent local organisation rather than with the abstract space of nation. In this, Makhfi diverged even from the metropolitan Indian left. Even as its revolutionary force intersected with tribal-agency mobilisations, Makhfi's poetry, echoing its ephemeral pathways of hujra circulation, sought survival in the space of oral whispers.
IV: Between Court and Multitude, an Ethics of Mutuality: 1919-1928
Of course the afterlives of upland worlds did not affect only one side of the border. In Afghanistan, as this final section argues, the 1920s saw a far more systematic development of similar ideas of anti-state mutuality, and from within the heart of an emergent nationalist state itself. This is not unexpected: individual cross-border activists including Makhfi gained ground in Kabul in the 1920s, but that decade saw a net disarticulation of cross-border activism and a rise in a sense of territory, geographic and social, that was yet more rooted in states than previously. In the colonial sphere, bureaucratic control in the frontier increased, while senses of newly-elaborate territory were subtler in Afghanistan. I describe this new wave of Afghan territorialisation below, before discussing its subversion. ... Everyone has a sort of mirror in their home But it's covered in rust and tarnish ... What is this rust but self-interested ego, That makes this one into 'Lord'; me into 'Akhund'; she, into 'Lady' ... If the idea of harmonious cooperation is ever let loose upon the world Then it's clear that all persons will become nobility (khawas) ... In all of our houses there is an old mirror The rust can't harm it; it is clear underneath ... Come! Let's place it atop the crossroads And the whole world will see it from the four directions ... There will be universal harmony [sulh-i kull] Everyone's benefit and injury will be clear for all to see The winners and losers will be visible Our place will be filled with the exercise of cooperation Each individual will be resplendent. 66 In this public address, the court jurist Mawlawi Wasi' adapts early modern Persianate ideas including sulh-i kull, 'universal harmony', to new politics. In the philosophy that Wasi' had studied, this concept described a resubjectivation of society, made possible when Divine Radiance was refracted through the ruler's faculty of rational balance, and outward into society where it ordered the psychologies of other individuals through balanced, just rule. elite brokerage and face-to-face webs of allegiance. It also contrasts to views that narrate militancy only as reaction to processes of empire. These are both important factors, but in neglecting emic histories one risks reinscribing imperial violence and also misses important lineages of politics in histories that have been considered well-studied. developed within long histories of resilience in a globally subalternised region. But returning to our introduction, even in displacing a lineal ideation-centred discussion, it is vital to address the reflexivity emergent in these spaces: to emphasise the dynamism of a society that is imagined by policymakers even now, as much as in the era of British empire, as isolated, 'inward-looking,' and trapped in 'tribal' frames of reference. 71 This raises questions for us today, as yet newer modes of violence expand through Khyber. As Manan Ahmed Asif argues, a view of frontiers as a lawless tribal terra nullius undergirds imperial policy in the US-led moment. 72 And Derek Gregory explores how the 'shadowland' of global frontiers-zones of exclusion where transnational force meets flexible legality-now suffuse ever-wider swathes of social space near the metropole. 73 In an afterthought Gregory raises the hope of 'contrapuntal' geographies but does not draw out what this might look like, apart from a fear that groups like the Taliban may be the most predictable result.
74
This critique is vital, but it has far outstripped any imagination of alternatives. Might not scholarship reinscribe the same violence it describes, if even critical academics have difficulty imagining the area's own embattled yet still living cosmologies? Certainly much of the Taliban's appeal is that of social levelling and anti-statism, much like the above. In an era of global securitisation, outsourced state functions, commoditised religion, market economy, and no direct memory of reciprocal customs of social cohesion like ashar, it is an easy manoeuvre to maintain social levelling while replacing mutuality with yet more exclusion and domination. But Muhammad Nur, singing at an exact point of transition when poetic knowledge became disembodied but became more mobile and more potent for it, alerts us to the possibility that 'lost caravans' might carry on in the face of all the above.
